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Abstract
This paper studies how peace driven by the demobilization of a non-state armed group affects household’s
investment decisions and their welfare in the short run. Starting in 2012, the government of Colombia
engaged in a peace process that ended with the demobilization of the country’s biggest non-state armed
group, FARC. This process had multiple ceasefire arrangements in 2013 and 2014 that reduced the exposure
to violence in those places that were previously under the control of an armed group. Using the presence of
armed groups as a measure of exposure to the war through a difference in difference approach, I find that the
FARC’s demobilization process led to a more than threefold increase in farm investment in areas previously
affected by the group, as farmers moved production from annual to perennial crops. I find no evidence that
investment came at the expense of short-term consumption. Finally, I find evidence of substantial positive
spillovers in investment to neighboring areas that were not directly affected by the FARC. The results suggest
that decreased investment may be an important mechanism through which armed conflict affects economic
development.
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Economic growth and development crucially depend on private sector investment, but individuals and firms
will only invest if they are confident of reaping the returns. Moreover, the level of risk firms are willing to
accept in their investment portfolio depends on their faith in the future. Violence and conflict may create
an environment where people are reluctant to make long term, risky investments. Peace brings a period of
hope and stability that may change the household’s willingness to undertake risky investments for the sake
of improving their future.
The presence of a non-state armed group has the potential to severely undermine investment. Violence
resulting from conflict between the armed group and the state can lead to the destruction of capital (Blattman
and Miguel, 2010; Collier, 1999; Ibanez and Moya, 2010; Justino and Verwimp, 2013). Furthermore, armed
groups often expropriate assets from the local population, either to fund their operations or to impose a new
social order (Arjona, 2016; Azam and Hoeffler, 2002; Engel and Ibanez, 2007). We may therefore expect
that the presence of an armed group will depress investment by making property rights less secure.
However, in many conflicts armed groups also perform state-like governing functions in areas where the
state is unwilling or unable to do so (Sierra, 2020; Cunningham and Loyle, 2021; Arjona et al., 2015). For
instance, in the Iraqi war, in some cases, civilians perceived IS rebels as a fairer and more effective actor for
governance than the local state (Revkin, 2021). In Nepal’s civil war, the Nepal-Maoist rebels created courts
that evaluated property and domestic crimes, and the success of this rebel governance strategy increased the
support of the local inhabitants to the Maoist cause (Loyle, 2021). The demobilization of an armed group
could thus create a vacuum that, if not filled by the state, may decrease the security of property rights.
On the other hand, there is also evidence that proximity to conflict may increase investment in some cases
like Angola’s civil war (Guidolin and Ferrara, 2007). Violence may also increase investment in buffer zones
because the uncontrolled area is not taxed or regulated, creating an environment that firms can leverage to
evade constraints from the government (Ch et al., 2018).
Empirical evidence on the effect of a transition to peace on investment is limited. Much of the previous
literature on armed conflict and investment has focused on the behavior of investors in large multinational
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firms, often involved in the mining or resource extraction sectors (Guidolin and Ferrara, 2007). Furthermore,
this literature focuses on the effect of shocks of violence, but does not address the potential transition to
a less violent environment. The effect of the reduction on the ability of households to make investment
decisions rebuild their productive capital and household welfare. Identifying the effect of violence (or peace)
is challenging because of the inherent endogeneity between violence and economic activity. Violence can be
a result of disinvestment, or violence and under-investment might both be caused by a similar shock such as
a climate or political event.
The contribution of this thesis to the existing literature comes from three areas. First, this article uses
a natural experiment that overcome the problem associated with endogeneity between war and welfare.
Second, this article studies the effect of an expected permanent positive shock on investment by household-
led farms - one of the most ubiquitous commercial enterprises in developing countries. Third, unlike the
previous literature I focus on the effect of demobilization process and not on marginal impacts of sporadic
attacks.
To estimate the effect of peace on investment, I exploit a natural experiment created by the recent peace
agreement between the government of Colombia and the FARC, the country’s largest non-state armed group.
Negotiations in this process began in 2012 and continued until a comprehensive peace agreement in 2016.
Conflict violence continued during the first years of the negotiations, but decreased substantially after the
FARC implemented two unilateral ceasefires at the end of 2013 and 2014. I take advantage of the data
reported in La Encuesta Longitudinal de Colombia (ELCA), a longitudinal survey of 4.700 rural households
that include a baseline in 2010 and two follow-ups in 2013 and 2016. I leverage the reported presence of
armed groups by the leaders of the villages during baseline survey in 2010 to identify areas that were likely
to be more affected by the cease fire. I argue that the historic presence of the armed group is a good measure
of the influence of FARC and the peace agreement reduced its exposure at a high pace. The post-treatment
period is defined as 2016 when ceasefires were in effect and an agreement was reached in the middle of the
year. My primary outcomes are household farm investment and the dietary index that I created called the
Food Diversity Index of the household, which measures the diversity of food purchases made in a month.
I find that the demobilization of the FARC led to a more than threefold increase in farm investment in
areas previously affected by the group. This investment partly manifests itself in a switch from short term
to perennial crops, consistent with the hypothesis that peace process leads to an increase in the security of
property rights and a resulting expansion of farmers time horizons. I find no evidence that investment came
at the expense of short-term consumption; exposure to demobilization doe not affect household nutritional
welfare as measured by a dietary diversity index. I also find evidence for positive spatial spillovers: investment
substantially increased in areas that were near former FARC strongholds but did not have historic FARC
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presence.
This thesis suggests that peace processes and demobilization of armed groups can have large positive
effects on investment by small household-based enterprises. A possible explanation for the difference between
my results and those in the literature on FDI is that armed group presence can affect investment through
two offsetting channels: by decreasing the security of property rights and by decreasing the state’s capacity
to regulate businesses. Small firms are less likely to benefit from the regulation channel, as they are less
strongly regulated to begin with, but bear the full cost of insecure property rights. Furthermore, it is
possible that large firms are less affected by the state’s inability to guarantee property rights because they
can safeguard their own property rights through private security forces. These results raise the possibility
that the demobilization of armed groups can create a considerable peace dividend driven by local small-scale
investment.
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the literature and context of the
research. Section 3 describes the data and it shows some prelim analysis. Section 4 describes the empirical






Colombia suffered from the longest civil war in the history of Latin America. The conflict started with the
foundation of the guerrilla FARC (Fuerzas Revolucionarias Armadas de Colombia) in 1962 and the guerrilla
ELN (Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional) in 1963. In the beginning they pretended to represent the rural
population necessities and aimed to overthrow the national government in an intent to implement rural
development politics. This war highly influenced the political and economic activity of the country, where
various actors like drug dealers, armed groups and the central government tried to control the state of law
of multiple regions of Colombia (Pardo, 2020).
In the beginning, the insurrection was localized and the guerilla groups did not have the political or
military power to disrupt the country as a whole. However, at the end of the 1980’s and the beginning of the
90’s the guerrillas started to use drug trafficking, illegal mining and extortion as sources of founds (Sanchez
and Formisano, 2003; Rangel, 2003; Reyes, 2016). These sources enabled non-state armed groups to gain
control of multiple territories in the country, especially in the rural and peripheral areas that were perfectly
located to boost the drug profits. As a response to the increase of guerrillas presence , some sectors of the
civil population created paramilitary groups in the middle of the 1990’s and consolidated in 1997 with the
creation of the AUC (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia in spanish). Colombia faced a war with three actors
for decades until the demobilization of AUC in 2006 and the peace process with FARC in 2016.
During the war FARC had a presence all over the country with a hierarchical organization that allowed
the armed group to have between 10.000 to 20.000 soldiers in its army (Verdad Abierta, 2016). The non-state
armed group fought on more than seventy fronts with the intention to achieve political and economic power.
At the beginning of the peace agreement the armed group controlled 242 districts, which represents 23% of
the total districts of the country and 12% of the total population (?). The presence of armed groups in the
rural areas undermine the power of the state and the possibility to create a well-articulated economy with
the country and the region (Medina et al., 2017). Moreover, the violence and the forced movement in the
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rural areas limited development, perpetuing poverty (Reyes, 2016). Furthermore, this conflict has affected
the country in many socioeconomic ways. The civil war reduced the productivity capacity of the country,
constraining the GDP growth and productive capacity (Cardenas, 2002; Montenegro and Posada, 1994; Villa
et al., 2014).
FARC captured territory all over the country until the government of Alvaro Uribe Velez created a turning
point by investing in defense and increasing offensive operations (Vargas and Godoy, 2013). This situation
helped the next president, Juan Manuel Santos, to initiate a peace negotiation in 2012. The negotiations
lasted 4 years, and they mainly took place in Cuba. The national government and the guerrillas continued
the fighting, while they were talking about the peace process in La Habana. This particular characteristic
created many swings during the first two years of negotiation because sporadic attacks undermined the will
to bargain. At the end of the second year of negotiation, FARC decided to implement an indefinite unilateral
ceasefire. This ceasefire was violated various times until the 20th December of 2014 when the government
and the non-state armed group agreed to create a definitive bilateral ceasefire. As a result, the country
experienced a substantial reduction of violence in the last period of the process, where FARC offensive
activities decreased by an astonished 98% (CERAC, 2016). In 2016 , both parties reached a settlement that
included four cornerstones: Rural development, political participation, Illicit drugs and victims reparations.
The rural development content aimed their efforts to support the farmers and help them to overcome the
rural poverty gap (de la Calle, 2019).
In the final stage of the peace agreement the fighters gave up their arms in transitory normalisation zones,
where FARC stopped violent incursions and the national government promised to support the demobilized
soldiers in their transition to a peaceful society. Moreover, the national government promised to create a
National Plan that will create a ”New Rural Colombia”, where the state will invest in rural zones (Mesa de
Conversaciones, 2018). Specifically, the final document focus the attention in provide public infrastructure
to the rural zones, give subsidies and loans, provide technical support, and provide a regulatory framework
for the land property rights. In order to show a clearer image of the peace agreement effect in the country
Figure 1 and Figure 2 illustrate the evolution of violence in districts that had exposition to FARC. As it can
be seen in the graphs the peace negotiation reduced the intensity of violence in most of the country.
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Figure 2.1. 2010 Intensity
Notes: The left map represents the intensity of the conflict in Colombia’s map. The right maps illustrate the zoom areas in the north
and south part of the country. The scale of intensity goes from 0 to 10, where 0 is represented in white color and 10 in red color. The
intensity scale was calculated summing FARC captures from the police and murders from FARC.
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Figure 2.2. 2016 Intensity
Notes: The left map represents the intensity of the conflict in Colombia’s map. The right maps illustrate the zoom areas in the north
and south part of the country. The scale of intensity goes from 0 to 10, where 0 is represented in white color and 10 in red color. The
intensity scale was calculated summing FARC captures from the police and murders from FARC.
2.2 Conflict, Peace and Investment
The recent peace agreement has created an opportunity for researchers in development economics and politi-
cal science to evaluate the post-conflict situation of a country like Colombia. Various authors have highlighted
the importance of the agreement in the improvement for the state to increase their presence in the rural
areas, surge productivity of the land, and establish better commercial conditions for the farmers (Vargas
and Godoy, 2016; Sanchez and Sanchez, 2019; Eufemia and Lana, 2018). The presence of armed groups in
the territory created conditions of lawlessness that preserved bad economic practices like uncontrolled defor-
estation, unlicensed mining and production of coca leaf. Most of articles about the peace agreement focus
their attention on the environmental footprint that FARC left in the country or the change in the supply
chain of cocaine production. Prem et al. (2018) find that areas with violence exposure by FARC increased
deforestation after the start of the ceasefire. They find that deforestation is weakened in municipalities with
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high control of the state and increased in the districts with land intensive economies. Masse and Billon
(2017) suggest that the illegal mining will persist in the post-war period because of the lack of institutions
and effective regulation. Lopez et al. (2019) finds that the areas that had the presence of FARC before
the peace agreement increased the coca leaf area instead of reducing it. Others authors find that the peace
process changed the future expectations of the households, where municipalities increased several education
outcomes and the total fertility rate after the permanent ceasefire in December 2014 (Guerra et al., 2021;
Prem et al., 2021) Even though multiple studies evaluate the footprint left by FARC, none of them focus
on the investment and food consumption decisions in the rural area after the demobilization of the armed
group.
The literature identifies a strong relation between the armed groups and investment decisions, but the
direction of causality may be ambiguous. The long standing presence of armed groups can change the struc-
tural characteristics of the region and their inhabitants (Grun, 2003; Verpoorten, 2009), and this condition
may preserve non-optimal farm production practices (Bozzoli and Bruck, 2009; Bruck and Schindler, 2009).
However, war can encourage investment under some circumstances. Firms can also benefit from the potential
market power they gain by operating in an unsafe environment, with the loss of government regulation of en-
vironmental or other standards, and their ability to capture land or other resources (Smith and Rosenblum,
2011; Christensen and Wirtschafler, 2020)
The conflict literature in Colombia finds mixed results of non-state armed group presence on investment.
The violence exposure of some regions in the country influenced the agricultural sector and rural development
for decades. Even though the general effect for the country was bad, it was heterogeneous across regions.
The armed groups aimed to move the local populations from subsistence agriculture to more profitable illegal
activities like mining and production of coca leaf (Sanchez and Formisano, 2003; Rangel, 2003; Reyes, 2016).
These highly profitable activities may support farmers in accessing the high profitable activities can support
farmers getting access to more food and overcome poverty, but the presence of armed groups in the rural
areas undermine the power of the state and limit the possibility of creating a well-articulated economy with
the country and the region. Moreover, the presence of some groups with different ideological purposes may
influence the decision of investment in some zones of the country, where left-oriented armed groups decrease
investment but right-oriented groups increase investment of firms (Medina et al., 2017).
The long term conflict may have affected capital and assets of firms by violent attacks, looting and
devastation reducing the production capacity of the farms (Blattman and Miguel, 2010; Justino, 2011).
Even though the effect of civil conflict on rural investment may be ambiguous, it is expected that farmers
and households may reap post conflict dividends. In some cases, economic activity like finance markets,
external investment and trade grow rapidly after the cease fire (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003; Murdoch
8
and Sandlre, 2002; Nillesen and Verwimp, 2010). In other cases, economic activity and welfare grow faster if
the assets of the household are not widely affected by the conflict (Justino and Verwimp, 2013). Nevertheless,
the decisions made in a new environment with a transition from high to low violent exposure may be complex
because households affected by threatening shocks may have bad initial conditions limiting their ability to
recover the capital that they had before war. And finally, farmers are also dealing with the fear and preserved
risk’s beliefs that changed their consumption patterns due to the presence of armed groups that imposed
investment decisions (Ibanez and Moya, 2006; Blarel et al., 1992; Clay, 1996), they often use cope strategies
that aim the portfolio investment of the farm to assets with high liquidity and low risk in case they need
to move for an economic shock (Grun, 2003; Verpoorten, 2009). Nonetheless it is not clear if the imposed
beliefs will linger in the farmer’s decision process for a long time and if they would go back to an optimal
capital track. Little evidence exists on whether and how individual investor decisions are affected by the
imposition of peace. I try to fill this gap in this thesis.
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Chapter 3
Data and Descriptive Statistics
3.1 Data
The dataset used in this research comes from the survey that the University of los Andes did during the years
2010, 2013 and 2016 in Colombia called Encueta Logitudinal de Colombia (ELCA). ELCA has data from
16 randomized districts all over the country in 9 different states. The survey collected 4,700 observations
in three years: 2010, 2013 and 2016. The survey follows the same invidious through the three rounds.
This survey has observation of the households 2 years before the peace agreement started and two more
observations during negotiations, which is a period of historic low violence rates in Colombia. I balanced
the panel data, which left 7,670 observations for the three periods.
3.2 Conflict Exposure
One of the most difficult questions in violence research is how to measure the conflict exposure. In this paper
exposure is identified by the presence of the armed group in the villages. The survey includes a question
about presence of armed groups in the villages 1. Households that are within those communities any year
between 2006 and 2010 are specified as observations that had violence exposure during the war period. I
assume that the village leaders knowledge about their community status are a good proxy of presence of an
armed group2. However, the question does not specify which armed group that had presence in the region,
this may be a problem for existence the ELN non-state armed group, which had not been demobilized by
2016. Appendix 8.4 I shows that ELN did not have territory control in the villages sampled in the survey,
then ELN activity is not affecting my identification strategy.
Moreover, I selected the years between 2006 and 2010 because it is a relative stable period of war with low
changes of presence of the armed group, this assumption is explained in the appendix 8.2 with the parallel
trend assumption. On average 7 per cent of the households are in zones that have presence of armed groups
1Specifically the question is : ”Does this community have presence of the armed group during one of these periods?”
2This assumption is very plausible given that rural villages in Colombia are small communities
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for at least one year between 2006 and 2010.
This article also takes into account the spillover effect that the reduction of violence may create. I am
capturing this side effect with the neighbor villages within the same political district. Unfortunately the
villages and the household locations are geocoded in order to protect the information of the respondents.
However, I can use the information at district level. Figure 4 shows the location of the villages used in this
research organized by percentage of villages with presence in the each district. The map shows that control
groups are located all over the map. There is one located in the north, one in the south, and the most of
them are in the middle of the country. The map also shows that the villages with historical presence of the
armed group are located all over the map, however there is greater prevalence of these villages in the south.
Figure 3.1. Location of the Villages
Notes: The orange color represents areas that the ministry of defence classify as having some level of presence of the armed group.
The colored districts that are not orange are the ones used in this research. The pink color represents district that have 0% of villages
with reported presence, which mean that they are the control group.The yellow color showcase districts reporting to have 7% villages
with presence or less within their territory. The purple color represents districts that have between 8% and 21% villages with
presence. The red color represents districts that have between 21% and 37% villages with presence.
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3.3 Investment
My primary outcome is investment by households in their farm. Specifically, I use the value reported by
households of the total investment in the farm in the last 3 years. To avoid miss-specification due to the
high proportion of 0s in the distribution of investment I employ the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation
of the variable.
Moreover, this thesis also uses the proportion of land that households reported dedicated to perennial
(permanent), annual (transitory) crops and short term crops3. Perennial crops are alive year-round and
are harvested multiple times before dying, in Colombia those crops are mainly used for tree based products
like banana, coffee, sugarcane and oil palm. Annual crops are plants that perform their entire life cycle
from seed to flower. It is common that all roots, stems and leaves of the plant die before an annual cycle.
Horticulture is the common use for annual crops. Farms that use mixed cropping grow more than one product
simultaneously in the same field, trying to have multiple harvest at different times of the year. Specifically, I
use the hectares dedicated to the general categories, and as I do with the total investment, I use the inverse
hyperbolic sine transformation of these variables too.
3.4 Food Security Measure
This paper uses a food diversity index as the main measure of welfare. The index that I created is based
on the Household Dietary Diversity Score (HDDS) Swindale and Bilinsky (2006). The food matrix of the
households contains 20 different categories that include a variety of options of food purchases (Appendix
8.1). The household reports if they buy each product and the frequency. I used the monthly frequency as







The parameter Pit represents a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the category is purchased in a
monthly or less frequency
3I classify short term crops as those that are either mixed or transitory crops because both land use strategies try to get
multiple harvests in one year
4Check the appendix 8.1 to see the validation of this assumption
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3.5 Descriptive Statistics
As I mentioned before, in the data, I observe one period prior to the negotiations and two periods during
the peace agreement, one of those periods is after the ceasefire. The two consecutive ceasefires created an
external variation of violence at the end of the peace process that this article is leveraging as its shock
to treatment. The Figure 3.2 shows the variation of murders and perceived presence in the villages with
FARC and in the places without FARC presence5. It looks that the presence has been decreasing since the
negotiation of the agreement, but the violence only decreased after ceasefires of 2013 and 2014. Moreover,
the trend of the investment on the farm 6 and the Food diversity index reported in figure 6 shows a parallel
trend leading from 2010 to 2013. Then, it looks that the reduction of violence is having effect after that
year.
Table 1 shows the balance characteristics of the main welfare features of the households, some properties
of production, labor and market condition and some violence characteristics of the village. There is not a
significant difference in the investment made to the farm between the two groups, neither the farm’s size.
Nevertheless, the farms with high exposure to the armed group have more area dedicated to permanent crops,
which may be explained by their location in the map, they are in areas where it is easy to sow tree based
crops like fruits. However, farms in villages with presence have more area dedicated to short term crops.
Households with presence exposure are less likely to sell on farm, sell to other districts and they work less
in agricultural sector as employed or farmer. It looks there is not a big difference selling to intermediaries.
Households with and without FARC presence are not statistically different in their total consumption.
However, the food security measures are different between the groups. The observations located in the
control area have an average of 0.69 in the DDI 7, and the households with presence and their neighbors
have 3pp less DDI. Moreover, the proportion of resources that the households use to buy food is higher 2.79
pp in the locations with some violence exposure.
Households with presence of the armed group are more likely to have murders and kidnappings than the
control villages. At the baseline, the treated sample shows the characteristics of areas with high exposure of
violence: Low food diversity, less market activity, less work in the agricultural sector, and more land used
in short term crops all of those combined with high rates of murders, kidnappings and presence of armed
groups.
5I am not including the neighbors in this analysis for two main reasons. First, war may have spillover effects that I want to
avoid in this preliminary analysis . Second, there is an entire section dedicated to them.
6The investment unit is Colombian pesos
7The maximum level of this index is 1, which means that the household bought the 20 categories
13
Figure 3.2. Violence
Figure 3.3. Farm Investment and DDI
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Table 3.1. Balance Table
Variables (1) (2) (3)
Control Presence Presence
v Control
Consumption (pesos) 449,237.41 439,536.63 -9,700.76
(385,975.72) (370,328.59) (28,792.89)
Share food 61.82 64.62 2.79**
(18.06) (14.55) (1.33)
Dietary Diversity Index (DDI) 0.69 0.66 -0.03***
(0.15) (0.15) (0.01)
Investment (pesos) 854,122.19 609,509.88 -244,612.27
(2,827,647.00) (2,415,067.50) (208,533.80)
Farm’s Size (Ha) 3.15 3.04 -0.11
(5.85) (6.17) (0.44)
Permanent Crops (Ha) 0.31 0.46 0.15**
(0.91) (1.19) (0.07)
Transitory Crops (Ha) 0.32 0.46 0.13
(1.03) (1.87) (0.09)
Short Term Crops (Ha) 0.63 0.92 0.28**
(1.39) (2.21) (0.11)
Sell on Farm 0.76 0.44 -0.31***
(0.43) (0.50) (0.04)
Intermediary (Big Company) 0.03 0.04 0.01
(0.17) (0.19) (0.02)
Sell Other Village 0.05 0.06 0.02
(0.22) (0.25) (0.02)
Sell Other District 0.13 0.12 -0.02
(0.34) (0.32) (0.03)
Work in Farm 0.48 0.40 -0.08*
(0.50) (0.49) (0.04)
Farm Employed 0.51 0.38 -0.13***
(0.50) (0.49) (0.04)
Murders 0.16 0.34 0.17***
(0.37) (0.47) (0.03)
Kidnappings 0.03 0.22 0.19***
(0.18) (0.42) (0.02)
Presence in Baseline 0.00 0.30 0.30***
(0.05) (0.80) (0.02)
Observations 1,499 202 1,884
Notes: Column (1) shows the average of the control group. Columns (2) showcases the average of the treated group. Column (3)
shows the difference between the two groups. The share of food estimation is calculated as Food Expenditure/Total Expenditure.
Intermediary variable shows the proportion of sales made by a big intermediary. The variables murders, kidnappings and presence are




I use the change in violence exposure experienced by those regions with and without prior FARC presence
to use a difference and difference approach. The equation (2) resumes my empirical strategy. I use 2013 as
the baseline year because it is the period immediately before the reduction in violence
Yit = α+ β1Pi + β3Ti + β4PiTi + θi + εit (4.1)
where Yi is the outcome of interest, Ti(Post) represents the post period, the 2016. Pi(Presence) takes the
value of 1 if the individual was in a zone that has exposure to the armed group at least one year during 2006 to
2010, 0 otherwise. θi represents household fixed effects and the εit shows the error of the model. This model
constrains the sample in that, I do not include the villages that do not report FARC occupancy but are in
one district that has at least one village with presence. In summary, I am not including the neighbor villages
of the FARC strongholds because there may be a spillover effect that affects the identification strategy.I
include these regions to measure spillover effects in section 5.2.
The two main assumptions of this empirical strategy are the parallel trend and that there are no con-
founding time-varying effects (Lechne, 2011). Basically, the empirical strategy assumes no time varying
unobservable that affects the treatment and control regions differently. Various robustness checks of these






Table 5.1 shows the reduction of three main outcomes associated with violence exposure: Murders and kid-
nappings. Villages that had an armed group presence before the peace negotiations experienced a reduction
of 32 pp in the probability to murder, saw a no statistical reduction in the kidnappings by 22 pp. Even
though the agreement was only in the negotiation stage, this table confirms that the ceasefires drove villages












Adjusted R2 0.502 0.556
Notes: Column (1) & (2) show the effect of the treatment on the reported murders and the kidnappings at village level. All the
estimates include as control the logarithm of consumption, the wealth and the number of people per household at baseline interacted
with the post variable. These estimates include village and time fixed effects. The p value significance is shown as: *** 0.01, **0.05 ,
*0.1, with errors calculated with cluster at village level.
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5.1.2 Investment
Households may adapt their investment after the reduction of violence. As discussed above, exposure to
violence may cause households to invest less overall, planting crops with short-run payoffs and low risk
(Arias et al., 2019). In the short run, the reduction in exposure to violence may not affect the size of the
assets, but may change the household allocation within its portfolio of investments. The table 5.2 shows the
effect of the ceasefire on the household’s investment decisions on the farm. The peace agreement it increased
the amount of on-farm investment by 3.8 relative to areas with no armed group presence. However, the size
of the farm is not increasing at all, which means that the households are not using their new investment to
enlarge their asset.
Furthermore, farmers are changing the type of crops they invest in. As shown in Table 5.2, farm house-
holds in areas with prior FARC presence. increase the area dedicated to permanent crops by 29% more
than the control, which means an increase in 90.2 m2 on perennial crops on average. Moreover, households
diminish the area dedicated to short term crops by 28.8% , which means a reduction of almost 181 m2.
Households change almost 271 m2 of their of land on average, which represents 28.8% of the total area
dedicated to crop productive usage.
These results suggest that households in areas with prior history of armed groups exchange assets with
low risk like short term crops for high risk positions like permanent crops1. These are not small changes.
they alter about 1/3 of their investment portfolio position. These results suggest that farmers perceive the
ceasefires as a signal of a better investment environment because they increase their investment risk position
and dedicate a large share of their available assets to this new strategy.
1Short term crops crops can be classified as low risk assets because farmers do not invest too much on them and they return
the benefit in a shorter period of time, allowing the households to avoid violent shocks that affect their wealth in the long
run(Grun, 2003). Permanent crops have the opposite purpose, they need more investment and the returns are expected in a
longer period of time
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Table 5.2. Investment Decisions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Investment Farm’s Size Permanent Crops Transitory Crops Short Term
Presence * Post 3.766*** -0.001 0.291** -0.073 -0.288**
(1.273) (0.101) (0.140) (0.068) (0.138)
Post 6.729 -0.017 -0.103 0.291 0.650
(6.919) (0.613) (0.410) (0.338) (0.475)
Constant 6.055*** 1.266*** 0.226*** 0.232*** 0.361***
(0.192) (0.018) (0.012) (0.010) (0.014)
Observations 3382 3382 3382 3382 3382
R2 0.607 0.850 0.741 0.722 0.672
Adjusted R2 0.207 0.698 0.478 0.439 0.339
Notes: Column (1) & (2) show the effect of the treatment interacted with the post-period on the hyperbolic sine transformation of the
investment and the farm’s size. Column (3) & (4) show the effect of the treatment interacted with the pos-period on the hyperbolic sin
transformation of the area of permanent and transitory crops. Column (5) shows the effect of the treatment interacted with the pos-
period on the hyperbolic sin transformation of the area of transitory plus mix crop. All the estimates include as control the logarithm
of consumption, the wealth and the number of people per household at baseline interacted with the post variable. These estimates have
household and time fixed effect. The p value significance is shown as: *** 0.01, **0.05 , *0.1, the errors are calculated with cluster at
village level.
5.1.3 Consumption and Welfare
In this section I explore the effect of the ceasefire on household welfare as measured by food security. Table
5.3 shows that the food diversity index that I created does not increase in zones with prior presence of the
armed group. Furthermore, the total consumption, the consumption dedicated to food and the proportion
of consumption that the household uses in food (share of food) do not appear to be influenced by the peace
agreement either.
Moreover, table 5.4 depicts which categories of food have a higher probability of being consumed by
treated households after the peace agreement. The results show that households increase their probability of
consuming protein (through chicken) by 8.3 pp, and of vitamins through fruit by 9.3 pp.. It also shows a 7.2
pp decrease in the probability of consuming potatoes, which is considered an inferior good and an increase
6.4 pp and 10.6 pp in luxury goods like candies and cookies respectively. The only category that has a
statistically significant effect is candies. These findings indicate that households do notsacrifice consumption
to fund the increase in farm invesment.
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Table 5.3. Dietary Diversity and Consumption
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DDI Consumption Food Consumption Share of Food
Presence * Post 0.03 -0.03 -0.02 1.82
(0.03) (0.07) (0.08) (2.75)
Post 0.44*** 8.32*** 5.88*** -101.26***
(0.15) (0.58) (0.66) (23.30)
Constant 0.69*** 12.80*** 12.27*** 62.17***
(0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.43)
Observations 3385 3385 3385 3385
R2 0.704 0.824 0.763 0.612
Adjusted R2 0.403 0.646 0.522 0.218
Notes: Column (1) shows the effect of the treatment interacted with the post-period on the Dietary Diversity Index. Column (2) & (3)
show the effect of the treatment interacted with the pos-period on the logarithm of the total consumption and the logarithm of food
consumption of the households. Columns (4) shows the effect of the treatment interacted with the post-period on the share of food
ratio.All the estimates include as control the logarithm of consumption, the wealth and the number of people per household at baseline
interacted with the post variable. These estimates have household and time fixed effect. The p value significance is shown like: ***
0.01, **0.05 , *0.1, the errors are calculated with cluster at village level.
Table 5.4. Expenditure and Consumption Categories
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Chicken Sausage Potato Fruits Candies Cookies
Presence * Post 0.083 0.054 -0.072 0.093 0.064** 0.106
(0.073) (0.069) (0.052) (0.061) (0.031) (0.103)
Post 0.549 0.997** 0.242 0.256 0.141 0.724
(0.423) (0.388) (0.479) (0.455) (0.283) (0.454)
Constant 0.609*** 0.355*** 0.836*** 0.716*** 0.945*** 0.672***
(0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.005) (0.011)
Observations 3381 3381 3381 3381 3381 3381
R2 0.623 0.655 0.670 0.652 0.564 0.644
Adjusted R2 0.240 0.304 0.333 0.298 0.120 0.281
Notes: Table shows the effect of the treatment interacted with the post-period on the DDI’s categories of consumption. All the estimates
include as control the logarithm of consumption, the wealth and the number of people per household at baseline interacted with the
post variable. These estimates have household and time fixed effect. The p value significance is shown like: *** 0.01, **0.05 , *0.1, the
errors are calculated with cluster at village level.
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5.2 Spillover Effect
Peace may have a buffer effect, where neighbors can also be influenced by the peace process. I include an
extra parameter Ni(Neighbors) that takes the value of 1 if the individual was in a village within the same
district of one of the villages that has presence of armed groups, 0 otherwise. The descriptive variables and
the comparison of this group with the main treatment and control are in the appendix 8.3.1. This model does
not constrain the sample as the one in the equation (2). The equation (3) resumes my empirical strategy.
Yit = α+ β1Pi + β2Ni + β3Ti + β4PiVi + β4TiNi + θi + εit (5.1)
Table 5.5 presents the effect of peace agreement on violence variables for the district with historic presence
and their neighbors. It looks that the peace agreement also influences the neighbors, especially with a
reduction of 19pp in the probability to experience kidnappings. Even though the peace agreement had
positive effects for the neighbors, the zones entirely dominated by the non-state armed group decreased
the murders 29pp more than their neighbors. There is no statistical difference of reduction of kidnappings
between the groups. One possible explanation of this can be the different influence that the armed group
had in various zones, it is expected that in places where FARC has strong historic presence, they will impose
rules through rebel governance techniques like murders, but kidnapping is a channel of funding that can be
applied in both places.
Moreover, table 5.6 shows the main investment and consumption decision of the households. Panel A
showcases that investment is positively affected by the peace agreement in the neighbors too, creating almost
a threefold growth of investment in the farm. This result is not statistically different from the effect of the
peace on the guerrilla’s strongholds. Moreover, farmers in the buffer zones increase 9% the land used in
annual crops and they do not change the land used for short crops. This increment represents 28m2, which
are 3% of the area dedicated to productive activities. These estimates show that farmers in the neighboring
zones are increase the investment, but the change in the use of land to perennial crops is 20 pp less than
those in the rebel group’s zones, transitory crops decrease 9 pp less than those of the guerrilla’s zone as well.
Table 5.6 depicts that the peace agreement has a consistent spillover effect over the neighbors.
Panel B in table 5.6 illustrates that peace agreement does not affect DDI in any group. Moreover,
this panel shows that the peace agreement does not have an effect in the total consumption, the food
consumption or the resources allocated to the food in any of the groups. These findings confirm that the
increase of investment is not growing at the expense of the consumption path of the households. The parallel





Presence * Post -0.31* -0.22
(0.16) (0.16)










Adjusted R2 0.507 0.552
Notes: Column (1) & (2) show the effect of the two treatments on the reported murders and the kidnappings at village level. All the
estimates include as control the logarithm of consumption, the wealth and the number of people per household at baseline interacted
with the post variable. The p value significance is shown like: *** 0.01, **0.05 , *0.1, the errors are calculated with cluster at village
level.
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Table 5.6. Buffer Effect - Investment and Consumption
Panel A: Investment (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Investment Farm’s Size Permanent Crops Transitory Crops Short Term
Presence * Post 3.71*** 0.00 0.30** -0.07 -0.29**
(1.26) (0.10) (0.14) (0.07) (0.14)
Neighbors * Post 3.04*** -0.01 0.09* 0.02 -0.09
(0.70) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06)
Post 1.39 0.01 -0.56 0.22 1.01**
(6.46) (0.53) (0.40) (0.29) (0.45)
Constant 5.71*** 1.20*** 0.27*** 0.21*** 0.36***
(0.16) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 5111 5111 5111 5111 5111
Difference 0.67 0.01 0.21 -0.09 -0.20
(1.33) (0.10) (0.15) (0.07) (0.15)
R2 0.609 0.858 0.750 0.716 0.644
Adjusted R2 0.206 0.710 0.490 0.422 0.277
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DDI Consumption Food Consumption Share of Food
Presence * Post 0.03 -0.03 -0.02 1.79
(0.03) (0.07) (0.08) (2.71)
Neighbors * Post 0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.47
(0.01) (0.05) (0.05) (1.49)
Post 0.49*** 8.08*** 5.78*** -98.26***
(0.13) (0.47) (0.55) (19.58)
Constant 0.68*** 12.82*** 12.31*** 63.32***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.34)
Observations 5136 5136 5136 5136
Difference 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 2.25
(0.03) (0.07) (0.07) (2.81)
R2 0.705 0.826 0.762 0.611
Adjusted R2 0.403 0.648 0.519 0.212
Notes: Panel A shows the effect of the treatments in investment decision. Column (1) & (2) show the effect of both treatments interacted
with the post-period on the hyperbolic sine transformation of the investment and the farm’s size. Column (3) & (4) show the effect
of both treatments interacted with the pos-period on the logarithm of the hyperbolic sin transformation of the area of permanent and
transitory crops. Column (5) shows the effect of the treatment interacted with the pos-period on the hyperbolic sin transformation
of the area of transitory plus mix crop. Panel B showcase the effect of the treatments in welfare. Column (1) shows the effect of
the treatments interacted with the post-period on the Dietary Diversity Index. Column (2) & (3) show the effect of the treatments
interacted with the pos-period on the logarithm of the total consumption and the logarithm of food consumption of the households.
Columns (4) shows the effect of the treatments interacted with the post-period on the share of food ratio . All the estimates include as
control the logarithm of consumption, the wealth and the number of people per household at baseline interacted with the post variable.
The p value significance is shown as: *** 0.01, **0.05 , *0.1, the errors are calculated with cluster at village level.
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5.3 Heterogeneous Effect
Farmer’s decisions may be influenced by their initial assets and the distance to the main markets. In this
section I evaluate the heterogeneous effect of land tenure, size of the farm and proximity to makets on farm
investment decisions.
I estimate the effect that land tenure has in the investment of the farm. Result in The table 5.7 show
that tenure, defined as ownership of land, explains a big proportion of the investment on the farm, where
farms that own the land increases almost 3.4 times the investment on the farm, however this result is not
statistically significant. Land ownership does not influence the increase in the farm’s size or the change from
perennial to short term crops.
A possibility that the initial farm size will influence the investment due to economies of scale or through
the possibility to have enough land to diversify the portfolio decision. The results in table 5.8 shows the effect
of the peace agreement in the lower quartile(small) and higher quartile(big) of the distribution of farm size
at baseline. Table 5.8 shows that the size of the farm does not impact the total investment or the allocation
of resources in the farm. However, It has an effect in the investment of short term products in the neighbor
villages with small sizes.
Finally, I evaluate if the distance to the main district affects the main outcomes. The results in table 5.9
showcase the effect of the peace agreement in the lower quartile(close) and higher quartile(far) of the distance
distribution to the main population municipality. Results show that the distance to the main population
municipality does not affect the investment decision on the farm.
These findings suggest that peace does not have any heterogeneous effect on the investment. This is an
important result because it looks that the peace dividend is homogeneous in the whole sample, which means
that all the farmers benefit from the new investment environment.
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Table 5.7. Investment by land tenure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Investment Farm’s Size Permanent Crops Transitory Crops Short Term
Post -5.78 -0.16 -0.32 -0.09 0.47
(4.73) (0.40) (0.35) (0.29) (0.48)
Neighbors * Post 3.72*** -0.06 0.10 -0.02 -0.12
(1.10) (0.11) (0.09) (0.05) (0.09)
Presence * Post 1.43 0.02 0.33* -0.09 -0.26*
(2.34) (0.19) (0.19) (0.09) (0.13)
Neighbors * Post * Tenure -0.50 0.08 0.00 0.05 0.01
(1.38) (0.12) (0.10) (0.06) (0.09)
Presence * Post * Tenure 3.35 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.07
(2.71) (0.25) (0.19) (0.14) (0.17)
Constant 5.94*** 1.26*** 0.28*** 0.22*** 0.38***
(0.16) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 4630 4630 4630 4630 4630
Notes: Tenure position is defined as ownership of the land. Column (1) & (2) show the effect of the two treatments interacted with
the post-period and the tenure position of the households on the hyperbolic sine transformation of the investment and the farm’s size.
Column (4). (5) & (5) show the effect of the two treatments interacted with the pos-period and the tenure position of the households
on the hyperbolic sine transformation of the area of permanent, transitory and short term crops. All the estimates include as control
the logarithm of consumption, the wealth and the number of people per household at baseline interacted with the post variable. The
p value significance is shown like: *** 0.01, **0.05 , *0.1, the error are calculated with cluster at village level.
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Table 5.8. Investment by Farm Size
Investment Farm’s Size Permanent Transitory Short Term
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Small Big Small Big Small Big Small Big Small Big
Post -5.9 -6.7 -0.3 -0.1 -0.3 -0.4 -0.1 -0.1 0.3 0.4
(4.9) (4.7) (0.4) (0.4) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.5) (0.4)
Neighbors * Post 3.4*** 2.9*** -0.1 0.00 0.1* 0.1** 0.00 0.01 -0.2** -0.1
(0.8) (0.7) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.09) (0.05)
Presence * Post 4.1*** 3.5** 0.00 0.03 0.4** 0.3** -0.1 -0.1* -0.4** -0.3**
(1.5) (1.4) (0.1) (0.1) (0.2) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.2) (0.1)
Neighbors * Post * Interaction -0.3 0.2 0.1 0.00 -0.05 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.2** -0.1
(1.2) (1.4) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
Presence * Post * Interaction -0.3 0.7 -0.02 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 0.05 0.06 0.3 -0.2
(2.3) (1.9) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.4)
Constant 5.9*** 5.7*** 1.3*** 1.2*** 0.3*** 0.3*** 0.2*** 0.2*** 0.4*** 0.4***
(0.2) (0.2) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 4642 5125 4642 5125 4642 5125 4642 5125 4642 5125
Notes: Odd columns show the effect of the two treatments interacted with the post-period and a dummy that represents the lower
quartile of the farm’s size distribution. Even columns show the effect of the two treatments interacted with the post-period and a dummy
that represents the higher quartile of the farm’s size distribution. All the estimates include as control the logarithm of consumption,
the wealth and the number of people per household at baseline interacted with the post variable. The p value significance is shown
like: *** 0.01, **0.05 , *0.1, the error are calculated with cluster at village level
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Table 5.9. Distance to the District
Investment Farm’s Size Permanent Transitory Short Term
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Close Far Close Far Close Far Close Far Close Far
Post -6.40 -6.47 -0.12 -0.10 -0.30 -0.32 -0.05 -0.05 0.37 0.40
(4.78) (4.69) (0.37) (0.37) (0.31) (0.32) (0.29) (0.29) (0.46) (0.46)
Neighbors * Post 3.09*** 2.63*** -0.01 -0.06 0.13* 0.09 0.02 0.02 -0.12 -0.10
(0.89) (0.74) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.08) (0.07)
Presence * Post 3.71** 3.13* -0.01 0.05 0.21 0.20 -0.06 -0.05 -0.17 -0.15
(1.76) (1.70) (0.11) (0.09) (0.15) (0.13) (0.11) (0.07) (0.18) (0.15)
Neighbors * Post * Interaction -0.69 2.08 0.05 0.43* -0.13 0.07 -0.02 -0.06 0.09 0.01
(1.62) (2.15) (0.12) (0.22) (0.11) (0.16) (0.07) (0.09) (0.13) (0.16)
Presence * Post * Interaction 0.26 5.28 0.06 -0.25 0.01 0.27 -0.08 -0.35 -0.08 -0.48
(3.41) (5.08) (0.23) (0.29) (0.19) (0.19) (0.20) (0.33) (0.32) (0.37)
Constant 8.72*** 8.78*** 0.90*** 0.89*** 0.22* 0.21* 0.12 0.11 0.18 0.18
(2.78) (2.62) (0.31) (0.30) (0.12) (0.13) (0.18) (0.18) (0.35) (0.34)
Observations 5012 5012 5012 5012 5012 5012 5012 5012 5012 5012
Notes: Odd columns show the effect of the two treatments interacted with the post-period and a dummy that represents the lower
quartile of the distance distribution. Even columns show the effect of the two treatments interacted with the post-period and a dummy
that represents the higher quartile of the distance distribution. All the estimates include as control the logarithm of consumption, the
wealth and the number of people per household at baseline interacted with the post variable. The p value significance is shown like:
*** 0.01, **0.05 , *0.1, the error are calculated with cluster at village level
5.4 Mechanisms
5.4.1 Investment
This thesis suggests that peace has large positive effects on investment. A possible explanation of the effect
is that armed groups can affect investment by decreasing the security of property rights and by decreasing
the state’s capacity to regulate business. Small firms in the rural zones in Colombia live in an informal
framework, which means they are less likely to benefit from the regulation channel, but experience the
consequences of weak property rights. Households may have seen the ceasefires and the peace agreement
as a strong signal of FARC’s activities decrease , leading farmers to expect secure property right. The
new investment portfolio changes to the households’s live in FARC strongholds suggest that this is the case
because they are exchanging benefits of short term for benefits in long term, where the expectation to hold
the assets for long periods is an important assumption for this new stratey.
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Moreover, one important factor in the property rights influence of the non-armed group is the tenure
land position of the households. Table 5.10 showcases the effect of the ceasefires in the land tenure position.
Results show that the ownership of the land increases in 9 pp, which means an increase of 11% compared
with baseline. Table 5.10 also depicts the effect of peace in the legal and illegal tenure. It looks that there
is not effect. As it is shown in the previous sections, the size of the farms does not increase for the peace.
However, results of table 5.10 suggests that a larger proportion of the farmers’ land is classified as property,
which means that farmers do not buy more land, but they legalize their previous land as property. These
findings suggest that households perceive that their property is more secure.
Table 5.10. Land Tenure Change
Own Land Leasing Tenure Illegal Tenure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Presence * Post 0.09* 0.09** -0.06 -0.06 -0.01 -0.01
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Post 0.18 0.21 -0.13 -0.14 0.04 0.04
(0.20) (0.16) (0.25) (0.20) (0.12) (0.10)
Constant 0.75*** 0.42** 0.30*** 0.48** 0.09*** 0.08
(0.01) (0.19) (0.01) (0.19) (0.01) (0.09)
Observations 4686 4686 5082 5082 5082 5082
Household FF Yes No Yes No Yes No
Village FF No Yes No Yes No Yes
R2 0.642 0.088 0.489 0.081 0.355 0.069
Adjusted R2 0.441 0.059 0.230 0.055 0.028 0.042
Notes: Legal tenure represents land that is leased or owned, illegal tenure represents land used without formal contract or owner.
Column (1) & (2) show the effect of the treatments interacted with the post-period on the probability to have at least one fraction of
land with ”ownership” status. Column (3) & (4) show the effect of the treatments interacted with the post-period on the probability
to have at least one fraction of land with ”Leasing” status. Column (5) & (6) show the effect of the treatments interacted with the
post-period on the probability to have at least one fraction of land with ”Illegal” status. All the estimates include as control the
logarithm of consumption, the wealth and the number of people per household at baseline interacted with the post variable. These
estimates have household and time fixed effect. The p value significance is shown as: *** 0.01, **0.05 , *0.1 the error are calculated
with cluster at village level.
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Chapter 6
Summary and Concluding Remarks
This thesis uses a panel of rural households to evaluate the effect of the Colombian peace agreement on
decisions and household welfare of rural households. I use the variation created by the ceasefire in the peace
process to compare regions with and without prior FARC presence to evaluate the effect of a peace signal in
the investment and food consumption decision on the households.
My findings suggest that the ceasefire period between 2013 and 2014 was interpreted by households as
a signal of a better investment environment. I find that households increased their investment on the farm
almost 4 times in villages that had historic presence of the non-state armed group after the ceasefire period
compared with the control group. The investment boost is not used to enlarge the farm’s size, but to change
the portfolio strategy of the households. Farmers increase the permanent crops by 39% and decreasing the
transitory crops by 28% compared with the baseline. These changes represent a reallocation of almost 28%
of the productive land used in crops. The heterogeneous result shows that peace does not have a different
effect among farmers. Specifically, the findings suggest that farmers believe that the long term benefits are
going to be better than the short term benefits for the unprecedented ceasefire that decreased the FARC
actions by 98% (CERAC, 2016). Moreover, these outcomes suggest that the investment growth did not come
at expense of the consumption. Households sustain their levels of dietary diversity, total consumption and
food consumption.
Furthermore, this thesis shows that the peace also had a spatial spillover on investment. Where households
that inhabit stronghold’s neighbor villages decreased the kidnappings and increase the investment on the
farm almost 3 times without decreasing the consumption.
The thesis’s findings suggest that the investment is an important channel through armed conflict affect
development. The short term reallocation of resources show that signals that advocate to a better future will
affect the long term benefits of the firms. Indeed, farmers expectation to avoid conflict create an investment
path that allocates more resources in longer term portfolio with higher risk.
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Appendix A: Food Diversity Index
This section of the appendix shows the categories of the food diversity index and the relation of the index
with welfare and consumption variables. The table 12 discloses that the food diversity index with monthly
frequency is capturing a welfare index of the households showcasing a strong relation of consumption and
wealth, which means that wealthier households are consuming more diverse diet. This confirms that the
index is not reflecting allocation of goods that may sustain a stable index, but a linear relation of welfare
and diverse diet. The categories of Food Diversity Index are:
• Bread and products created with flour





• Sauces and jam
• Potato and tubers
• Rice, cereals, pasta and pasta
• Beans, pea and lentils
• Plantain
• Tomato, green beans, carrot, lettuce, onions, and other fresh vegetables
• Banana, orange, lemon, apple, pineapple and other fruits
• Cooking oil, butter
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• Salt, sugar, and other condiments
• Coffee, chocolate and other hot beverages
• Candies and other snacks
• Canned products like tuna, sauces and beans
• Cookies
• Sodas and processed beverages
Table A1. Food Diversity Index relation
(1) (2)












Notes: Column (1) & (2) show the effect of the logartihm of consumption, the logarithm of wealth index and the two time dummies in
the Food diversity index for a biweekly and monthly frequency. treatments interacted with the post-period on a selection of dummies
that reflect the market decision. All the estimates include as control the logarithm of consumption, the wealth and the number of
people per household at baseline interacted with the post variable. The p value significance is shown like: *** 0.01, **0.05 , *0.1.
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Appendix B: Validation of Difference
and Difference Assumptions
The first assumption that I must validate is that of a parallel trend. The results of the main estimates are
replicated in figures B.1 with the inclusion of a previous period to prove the parallel trend assumption. The
figures compare the groups with the 2010 period(pre) and with the 2016 period(post). This means that the
baseline period is 2013 as the other estimates in the article. Figure B.1 shows that the estimates hold2 the
parallel trend assumption because there is not effect in the previous period(pre). Moreover, the effect is clear
in the post treatment period for the main variables.
The second assumption that must hold is the unconfounded relation between of the intervention with the
outcome. This means that the outcomes that I use do not influence the probability of being treated or in
this case that the reduction of violence is driven by one of the outcomes and not by the external reduction of
violence. To sustain this assumption I used a stability period during the war which may lead the individuals
to not expect a surprise reduction of violence. Graph 6 shows the proportion of villages that reported
presence for the years 2002 to 2016. I included a discontinuity regression for the presidential government
periods. As it can be seen in the graph, the period between 2006 to 2010, which is the second period of
Uribe, is having a stability phase of the war that this research leverage. It is unlikely that households or
the armed group had a clue about the peace agreement because the presence is decreasing only after 2010.
Moreover the government of Santos was a turning point of the way that war was managed.
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Figure B.1. Parallel Trend Validation 1
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The Figure C.3 shows the variation of murders and presence of the three groups. It looks that the presence
has been decreasing since the negotiation of the agreement, but the violence only decreased after 2013.
Moreover, the trend of the investment on the farm and the Food diversity index is having a change in the
parallel trend since 2013 in neighbors and villages under the control of the non-state armed group.
The table 13 shows the balance characteristics of the main welfare features of the households, some
properties of production, labor and market condition and some violence characteristics of the village. There
is not significant difference among the investment made to the farm for the three groups, neither the farm’s
size. Nevertheless, the farms with high exposure to the armed group have more area dedicated to permanent
crops, which may be explained by their location in the map, they are in areas where it is easy to sow tree
based crops like fruits. Households with presence exposure are less likely to sell on Farm, sell to other
districts and they work less in agricultural sector as employed or farmer. It looks there is not a big difference
selling to intermediaries.
Households with presence and their neighbors are not statistically different in their total consumption.
However, it looks that the food security measures are different among the groups. The observations located
in the control area have an average of 0.69 in the DDI, and the households with presence and their neighbors
have 3pp and 2 pp less DDI respectively. Moreover, the proportion of resources that the households use to
buy food is higher in the locations with some exposure, including the neighbors.
Households with presence of the armed group are more likely to have murders and kidnappings than
their neighbors and the control villages. At the baseline, sample shows the characteristics of areas with high
exposure of violence: Low food diversity, less market activity, less work in the agricultural sector, all of those
combined with high rates of murders, kidnappings and presence of armed groups.
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Figure C.1. Violence
Figure C.2. Farm Investment and DDI
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Table C1. Balance Table
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Control Neighbors Presence Presence
v Control v Control v Neighbors
Consumption (pesos) 446,760.38 3,334.45 -9,534.04 -12,868.49
(384,451.19) (14,941.09) (28,482.40) (23,900.61)
Share Food 61.82 3.63*** 2.79** -0.83
(18.06) (0.75) (1.33) (1.30)
Dietary Diversity Index (DDI) 0.69 -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.01
(0.15) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Investment (pesos) 854,122.19 -175,732.38 -244,612.27 -68,879.88
(2,827,647.00) (113,923.82) (208,533.80) (190,273.38)
Farm’s Size (Ha) 3.15 -0.25 -0.11 0.14
(5.85) (0.27) (0.44) (0.55)
Permanent Crops (Ha) 0.31 0.23*** 0.15** -0.08
(0.91) (0.05) (0.07) (0.11)
Transitory Crops (Ha) 0.32 -0.11*** 0.13 0.24***
(1.03) (0.04) (0.09) (0.08)
Sell on Farm 0.76 -0.04* -0.31*** -0.28***
(0.43) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
Intermediary .031588 -.013904* .006873 .020777
(.174981) (.008058) (.01516) (.013087)
Sell Other Village 0.05 0.05*** 0.02 -0.04
(0.22) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03)
Sell Other District 0.13 -0.08*** -0.02 0.07***
(0.34) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Work in Farm 0.48 -0.12*** -0.08* 0.04
(0.50) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
Farm Employed 0.51 -0.09*** -0.13*** -0.04
(0.50) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
Murders 0.16 0.01 0.17*** 0.17***
(0.37) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Kidnappings 0.03 0.02** 0.19*** 0.17***
(0.18) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Presence 0.00 0.06*** 0.30*** 0.23***
(0.05) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04)
Observations 1,499 2,574 1,884 1,277
Notes: Column (1) shows the average of the control group. Columns (2) and (2) showcase the difference of the two treatment group
with the control group. Column (4) shows the difference between the two treatment groups. The share of food estimation is calculated
as Food Expenditure/Total Expenditure. Intermediary variable shows the proportion of sales made by a big intermediary. The variables
murders, kidnappings and presence are calculated in a village level. The p value significance is shown like: *** 0.01, **0.05 , *0.1 .
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Parallel Trend
This section validates the parallel trend assumption of the model specification of the equation (3). Just as
in the section 8.2, the first 7 variables are holding the parallel trend assumption.
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Figure C.3. Parallel Trend Validation 1
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Appendix D: Influence of Other
Groups in Violence Exposure and
Investment Decision
An important influence in the agricultural market in Colombia is the coca production. The rents of this
product are driving the investment decision of the farmers for decades. This profitable product is leading
the farmers to change legal products for illegal products (Prem et al., 2018). I checked the effect of this
product in the decision of the farmers with the UNODC satellite data of coca fields in Colombia. The figure
7 shows that villages that I am studying do not have illegal crops. This findings suggest that the villages
are not influenced by the coca production, which give confidence to think that the decision of the farmers
and the market is not influenced by the disruption of this product.
Moreover, the presence of other armed groups may influence the reduction of violence and the constrain
that face the households. Colombia had the influence of other armed group during the war, the ELN (Ejercito
de Liberacion Nacional). The figure 8 shows the intensity index for the ELN group in 2016. It looks that
this group is not having any influence during the peace period in the villages studied for this article.
The other influence group in Colombia is the organized crime in the big cities. They are mostly located
in the big cities or in the areas with production of coca. The figure 9 shows the incidents that the organized
crime had in Colombia. It looks that they had some effect in the control groups at the north of the country,
and that may explain the little increase in murders for the control in 2016. However, those groups are not
having a high influence in the control groups and the figure 4 shows that the increase is little and follow a
well defined parallel trend.
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Figure D.1. 2010 Coca
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Figure D.2. 2016 ELN
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Figure D.3. 2016 Organized Crime
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Appendix E: Government Support
Programs
One important cornerstone of the peace agreement was the commitment of additional government support
for farmers in their productive activities amid in providing reparations to the victims of violence. Given
that 2016 year was the end of the negotiation, then it is unlikely that this programs has had started or
impulsed different politics during that year. However, I confirm that those programs did not have any effect
in the main effect of this article including them as controls of the main estimates. Table E.3 shows that
the robustness check of an additional source of variation explained by this programs is not influencing the
estimators.
Moreover, table E.3 includes a second panel that illustrates the evolution of the main government support
programs. Where column (1) shows the effect of the ceasefires in the probability to have any support by
the government. Column (2) and (3) show the effect on the main tenure support programs of Colombia.
The results show that there is not a different increase in the government support driven by the peace during
the last year of the agreement. These results confirm that the increase of investment happened because
the expectation of the households changed and not because the government boosted the investment through
agricultural programs.
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Table E1. Support Agricultural Programs as controls - Investment and Consumption
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Investment Farm’s Size Permanent Transitory Short Term Crops
Presence * Post 3.67*** 0.00 0.30** -0.08 -0.29**
(1.21) (0.10) (0.14) (0.07) (0.14)
Neighbors * Post 2.95*** 0.00 0.10* 0.02 -0.10
(0.68) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06)
Post * Support Program -0.15 -0.02 -0.04 -0.05 -0.01
(0.69) (0.06) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05)
Post -6.66 -0.07 -0.33 -0.00 0.47
(4.74) (0.35) (0.31) (0.29) (0.46)
Constant 5.28*** 1.17*** 0.25*** 0.18*** 0.36***
(0.42) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Observations 5125 5125 5125 5125 5125
R2 0.609 0.856 0.744 0.715 0.638
Adjusted R2 0.207 0.709 0.481 0.423 0.266
(1) (2) (3)
Support Tenure Program 1 Tenure Program 2
Presence * Post -0.04 0.00 0.00
(0.04) (0.00) (0.00)
Neighbors * Post -0.04 0.00 0.00
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00)
Post 0.02 0.01 0.00
(0.17) (0.01) (0.02)
Constant 0.63*** 0.00** 0.00***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Observations 5129 5129 5129
R2 0.703 0.600 0.502
Adjusted R2 0.398 0.191 -0.008
Notes: Support is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if farmers received any support or subsidy from the government, 0
otherwise. Tenure program 1 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the farmers were beneficiaries of the program called
”Titulacion de bladios”, 0 otherwise. Tenure program 2 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the farmers were beneficiaries
of the program called ”Programa de Tierras”, 0 otherwise.
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